This is the fifth in a series of posts on postmodernism. It follows posts on Nietzsche’s politics and philosophical ideas, on the core ideas of postmodernism, and an introduction and historical background to postmodernism.
A central contributor to postmodernism was the post-structuralist philosophy coming out of France in the 1970s. This in turn emerged from the structuralist thinkers of the late 1950s and early 1960s. They took up terms and concepts developed by Ferdinand de Saussure, who had founded structural linguistics early last century.
The politics of language
Saussure’s linguistics rejected the theory of language formulated by John Locke. For Locke language was simply a passive reflection of the world: words are effectively just “phantoms of the material world,” as Karl Marx said, or as Alex Callinicos put it, “meaning is held to consist in the entity outside language to which it refers… ideas are the signs of things and words the signs of ideas” (Callinicos page 26). Ultimately this way of thinking assumes the existence of God, who establishes external meanings and equips individual human beings to identify them.
Marx had a different view. He understood that language, simply capturing and housing information from external reality also shapes that information within our minds. Marx also pointed out that this process is social not individual: language provides a social framework through which individual minds come to grips with the world around them. So language plays a political role, a means for dominant classes impose their worldview, which can be contested by opposing classes.
Like Marx, Saussure recognised that there are no self-evident associations between external things, ideas and words. And like Marx, he saw that meanings are not constructed at the individual level. However, he tended to ascribe to language its own system of meaning, sharply separated off from the rest of society: “a system closed into itself, basking in its own internal coherence”, “like a game of chess” (Sebastiano Timpanaro pages 145-51).
Interestingly, Saussure himself did not think that his linguistics could be applied to other aspects of society. “We are convinced,” he said, “that whoever sets foot on the ground of language is bereft of all the analogies of heaven and earth”. Economic value, for example, is “rooted in things and their natural relations” (quoted in Timpanaro pages 157-8). Nevertheless his concepts were applied to anthropology by Claude Levi-Strauss, and to the psychology of Jacques Lacan, and were hybridised with Stalinism by Louis Althusser (see here. For a longer critique of Althusser see here). Structuralism also prepared the ground for Derrida’s later assertion that “there is no outside-text”, that language is effectively the only reality.
Claude Levi-Strauss, structural anthropology, and the attack on history
Claude Levi-Strauss is perhaps the most important representative of structuralism. His early work is known for its hostility to Eurocentric racism, which identified the progress of a society with its degree of similarity to the societies of the major western powers. In his book Structural Anthropology he rebutted the crude analogy between cultural development and biological evolution, used to support Eurocentrism. (Levi-Strauss Structural Anthropology page 4) But this became an attack on any concept of historical development, or the analysis of any phenomenon in historical terms.
In reality, phenomena like the Christian church or women’s oppression are irreducibly historical, undergoing qualitative changes over time as part of the wider society. For Levi-Strauss, however, a “detailed history” of any phenomenon is needed precisely to cull its superficial, changeable elements from the supposedly essential, ahistorical core beneath them. “By showing institutions in the process of transformation,” he wrote, “history alone makes it possible to abstract the structure which underlies the many manifestations and remains permanent throughout a succession of events”. This underlying structure consists of humanity’s collective unconscious thought. It provides the key to understanding not just language but “the kinship system, political ideology, ritual, art, code of etiquette, and – why not? Cooking.” (Structural Anthropology page 85). It is valid across times and cultures.
If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms upon content, and if these forms are the same for all minds – ancient and modern, primitive and civilised (as the study of the symbolic function, expressed in language, so strikingly indicates) – it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underling each institution and each custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other customs, provided of course that the analysis is carried far enough…
With surprising rapidity – which shows that one is dealing with an intrinsic property of certain modes of thinking and action – collective thought assimilates what would seem the most daring concepts, such as the priority of mother-right, animism, or, more recently, psychoanalysis, in order to resolve automatically problems which by their nature seem forever to elude action as well as thought. (Structural Anthropology pages 19-23)
This mystical collective unconscious also seems to explain economic forces: “Economic history is, by and large, the history of unconscious processes”. (Structural Anthropology page 23)
Things are as they are because our collective unconscious wants them that way. Women’s fashion, for example,
actually is, in the highest degree, a phenomenon that depends on the unconscious activity of the mind… this seemingly arbitrary evolution follows definite laws. These laws cannot be reached by purely empirical observation, or by intuitive consideration of phenomena, but result from measuring some basic relationships between the various elements of costume. (Structural Anthropology page 59)
Levi-Strauss also strays into irrationalism. In The Raw and the Cooked he talked of “the search for a middle way between aesthetic perception and the exercise of logical thought” and tells us that Richard Wagner, the nineteenth century composer and right wing irrationalist ideologue, is “the undeniable originator of the structural analysis of myths”. (Raw and Cooked pages 13-15)
Liberation has no place within this worldview. The notion that oppressed layers of society might develop a collective, conscious critique of the current social order, then act collectively to overthrow it, simply does not exist. This is structuralism’s greatest legacy to postmodernism.
From structuralism to postmodernism
Structuralism’s denial of historical development reflects its own historical position, flourishing as it did during the years of the post-world war 2 boom when fundamental social change seemed to have stopped forever, summed up in Daniel Bell’s proclamation of the “end of ideology”. (For an excellent summary of this period see chapter 1 of The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After, Chris Harman 1998.) The stifling conservatism of this era was broken by the mass upsurges of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Every conservative ideology, including structuralism, was thrown up in the air.
When the wave of liberation struggles ebbed in the 1970s, things didn’t return to “normal”. A new world was left in its wake. It was harsher: profit-making involved less productive investment and expansion and more speed-ups at work, welfare cuts, casualisation, and a corporate feeding frenzy around the sale of public assets – all reinforced, and also masked, by globalisation. Yet there was little resistence. Working people felt weak, scared, demoralised, and many drifted away from trade unions or any sense of us-against-them. Among students and intellectuals especially there was a sense that liberation theories had been tested out, and had failed. This was the soil in which postmodernism took root. Structuralist thinkers either adapted to the new circumstances, like Foucault and Althusser, or they were pushed to the sidelines.
The next posts in this series will examine the theories and impact of the most influential postmodernist thinkers, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.
Sources not hyperlinked in the blog post:
Alex Callinicos, Is There a Future for Marxism? McMillan 1982
Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology Basic Books New York London 1963.
Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked Jonathan Cape London 1970
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Collins and Sons Glasgow 1964. Also available online.
Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism, New Left Books 1975.
Apologies to anyone interested in this blog, for the long delay between posts. My personal circumstances have changed, so I can finally get back to it.
“It is the media which has facilitated the speedy public ‘acceptance and recognition’ of not just ‘transgender and gender diverse people’ but the completely new belief that children are ‘transgender,’ together with the idea that invasive medical intervention is a necessity. The press has a big influence on people’s views, including parents, teachers and all adults in a child’s life, and it plays a pivotal role in normalising and creating acceptance of ideas within society as a whole. Whether individual people believe that some children are ‘transgender’ and that “physical treatments for younger adolescents” is a good idea is largely dependent on a societal consensus created in large part by the way the media reports it.”
Referral figures for the Tavistock clinic Gender Identity Development Service, just announced, have risen from 1,419 last year to a total of 2,016 this year, an increase of 42%. The number of children who feel they are ‘trapped in the wrong body’ and need to transition to the opposite sex continues to soar year on…
This is the fourth in a series of posts on postmodernism. It follows a post on the politics of Nietzsche.
The leading lights of postmodernism politely overlook the vileness of Nietzsche’s far-right politics, or explain it away, because his philosophical ideas furnish them with ammunition against Marxism and other theories of human liberation. Like them, Nietzsche wanted to undermine the moral value and practical possibility of socialism; they draw heavily on Nietzsche’s interlinked attack on humanism, human reason, and materialism (the idea that a material world definitely exists, and we can know true things about it; this will be the subject of a future post).
Nietzsche’s hostility to materialism
Nietzsche denied the existence of a social or even natural reality beyond the surface appearances of nineteenth century German capitalism. “The ‘apparent’ world is the one and only: the ‘true’ world is only a mendacious gloss.” (quoted Lukacs Destruction of Reason*) He tied the philosophy of materialism to Christianity: he ridiculed what he called the Beyond, in which he equated the kingdom of God, socialism, and a definite, knowable material world. Thus we cannot identify trends beneath the surface of events that might show us how to transform society. In fact, social change takes place only within the closed circle of “eternal recurrence”: there will be a return to barbarism and slavery, but never equality.
The will to power
The potential for solidarity amongst the working people is another illusion. The collective interest is at best an unstable by-product of individual rivalry. For the heart of reality is the capitalist marketplace, where everyone competes with everyone else, but which is now pumped up into a grand philosophical concept: the “will to power”.
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (-its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement (“union”) with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. (Will to Power 636*)
The “herd” can never reach the collective understanding of society that would be required for democratic, revolutionary change. We are all trapped within “perspectivity” or “perspectivism”: everyone’s perception, and hence their reality and truth, are different. Reason, the Enlightenment’s great weapon for social change, is no good either. Truth and falsehood are indistinguishable. Logic does not allow us to grasp reality, because logic consists of static categories, whereas reality is fluid.
In order to be able to think and draw conclusions, it is necessary to acknowledge that which exists: logic only deals with formulae for things which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: “that which is” is part of our optics… The character of the world in the process of Becoming is not susceptible to formulation: it is “false” and “ contradicts itself”. (WP 477, 517).
None of this need paralyse the forces of right wing reaction. They need only a pragmatic, whatever-works-for-us concept of reality, and that is just what Nietzsche offers. Activity, Nietzsche says, does not just reveal but actually creates truth: “we can only take cognisance of a world we ourselves have made”. One truth prevails over other only be dint of superior force behind it. And a belief may be “pragmatically ‘life-preserving’ and still be false: (WP 483, 495). Indeed, some false ideas are pragmatically necessary. “Truth is that kind of error without which a certain species of living beings cannot exist” (493, 520). Myth on the other hand has an operational value and is therefore real. The Goddess Eris “spurs even the inept to work… neighbour competes with neighbour… one potter will resent another, one carpenter the other, beggar envies beggar and singer envies singer” (quoted Lukacs Destruction of Reason)
For Nietzsche the will to power also neatly solves an uncomfortable ambiguity in the concept of bourgeois individualism. For while individualism has the benefit of cutting across worker solidarity, it also leads to notions of personal worth that can only be a nuisance in the heads of “slaves”. The human subject, Nietzsche says, is a “fiction”, an incoherent bundle of drives and forces “whose interaction and struggle lie at the bottom of our thought and our consciousness in general” (485, 490). Only a great will – a man of power, or a great artist can weave these threads together, in an act of self-creation; members of the herd cannot.
Ditching personality as a general human characteristic, Nietzsche focuses on the body: “the richer, more distinct, and more tangible phenomenon” (WP 489), a later focus for Foucault and other postmodernists.
Nietzsche and postmodernism
References to “slaves” are embarrassing to the postmodernists. These people are not driven, like Nietzsche, to bring on a bestial, unbridled attack on the workers’ movement. They just wanted arguments to bring down theories of human liberation, to supply a philosophical rationale for the political retreat of the late 1970s and 1980s, which ushered in the neoliberal era. This is where Nietzsche’s rantings delight them. There is nothing to be oppressed, nothing to liberate. There are no solid truths to support a challenge to the whole social system, just the eternal prison of the will to power. We can choose small issues to fight over, but the big picture will never change.
The other main theoretical underpinning to postmodernism was the structuralist theories popular in the early to mid-1960s, and these will be the topic the next post in this series.
*The Will to Power is a long list of numbered epigrams. Since these stay the same between different editions of the book, they are handier to use than page numbers. The exact wording changes, of course, between different translations. The epigrams quoted above were taken from an old edition, TN Foulis London 1910. The Will to Power was published posthumously by Nietzsche’s sister, leading to allegations that she meddled with the text to advance her more explicit racism and more focused commitment to German imperialism. The text of The Will to Power is however consistent with the rest of Nietzsche’s works.
**Lukács published The Destruction of Reason in 1952. The book traces the history of the major irrationalist currents of thought over the preceding two centuries,up to the rise of Nazism. In the early 1920s Lukacs made important contributions to Marxist theory through books such as History and Class Consciousness. Afterwards he bent the knee to Stalin. The Destruction of Reason is nonetheless one of the most useful I have come across for understanding the background to postmodernism. Fortunately the chapter on Nietzsche is available free online
This is the third in a series of posts on postmodernism.
Nietzsche provides many of the ideas that are now identified with postmodernism. “I am simply a Nitzschean,” Foucault said. Derrida “not only fosters Nietzsche’s work but evolves it within the sphere of language”. Deleuze evangelised about him to Paris intellectuals in the early 1960s, via his book Nietzsche and Philosophy, while Irigaray “undertakes to interrogate Nietzsche, the grandfather of poststructuralist philosophy, from the point of view of water”.
Nietzsche’s key works cover wide areas of culture and philosophy. His lasting influence derives partly from his scholarship and exciting style; partly from his ability to discern from afar the period of wars and revolutions to come, and the issues they have continued to pose for modern society; and partly from the very general, symbolic way in which he himself posed those issues: this vagueness allows his writings to be applied fairly readily to new situations. While Nietzsche was deeply affected by the events of his times, he responded to them indirectly, through subtle word-play, irony and paradox, and above all by using pseudo-mythic imagery.
Georg Lukács provides the best overview of Nietzsche’s politics and philosophy that I know of, and it forms the basis of this post.*
The historical context
Nietzsche wrote during a time of transition for world capitalism. On the one hand, the system was still expanding, through colonialism and the growing concentration and centralisation of large corporations. Reflecting this, the dominant ideology was one of progress, reason, and science, brought by the superior white races to the primitive Africans, sly Asiatics, and idle, hot-headed Arabs. The world was a good place and steadily getting better. On the other hand there were shadows. One was the gradual intensification of imperialist rivalries. Another was the menace of the working class. In 1871 Germany defeated France in war, but during that war the workers and National Guard of Paris rose in revolution, briefly setting up the worker’s city-state of the Paris Commune. A minority of intellectuals and artists sensed and expressed these shadows, and darker times to come. Among them were philosophers who justified the status quo not as a glorious place, but on the grounds that its evils were permanent features of the human condition.
Nietzsche was part of this latter current. What distinguished him within it was his extreme political agenda. He called for an assault of unbridled savagery against everything progressive and forward-looking, most particularly socialism and the workers’ movement.
When the Paris Commune was put down, with the slaughter of 20,000 working people, Nietzsche wrote:
Hope is possible again! Our German mission isn’t over yet! I’m in better spirit than ever, for not yet everything has capitulated to Franco-Jewish levelling… Over and above the war between nations, that international hydra which suddenly raised its fearsome heads has alarmed us by heralding quite different battles to come. (quoted in Lukács, Destruction of Reason p327)
For Nietzsche, society divides naturally into masters and slaves. Societies that attempt to conceal or deny this fundamental truth have been infected and corrupted by the slave class, and are sickly as a result.
Such phantoms as the dignity of man, the dignity of labour are the shabby products of a slave mentality hiding from its own nature… Wretched the seducers who have deprived the slave of his innocence by means of the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge! (quoted in Lukács Destruction of Reason p325)
With its admonitions against rank, acquisitiveness and militarism, Christianity
is no more than the typical teaching of socialists… Behind all this there is the outburst, the explosion of a concentrated loathing of the “masters” – the instinct which discerns the happiness of freedom after such long oppression… (Mostly a symptom of the fact that the inferior classes have been treated too humanely.) (The Will to Power epigram 209 – **see footnote)
Nietzsche fantasised about a Europe ruled by a true-blooded nobility of refined sensibilities and manners, generators and patrons of fine art and literature. Indeed, he thought, if the capitalists had been able to “share the hereditary nobility’s distinction in glance and gesture, then perhaps there would be no socialism of the masses”:
A higher civilization can only come about when there are two distinct social castes: that of the working people and that of the leisured, those capable of true leisure; or, to put it more strongly, the caste of forced labour and the caste of free labour. (quoted in Lukács)
The ideal aristocratic leaders were
the kind of exuberant monsters that might quit a horrible scene of murder, arson, rape and torture with the high humour and equanimity appropriate to a student prank. They would do so in the conviction that the poets would have plenty to celebrate again. Behind all these noble breeds there is no mistaking the beast of prey, the magnificent blond beast in greedy search of spoils and conquest … It is the noble races that have left the word ‘barbarian’ in their tracks wherever they prowled; even their highest culture betrays this awareness and their pride in the fact. (quoted in Lukács)
One quality of this elite, he thought, was to be removed from the understanding of their social inferiors, since “comprendre c’est egaler” – to comprehend is to equalise (Will to Power 943). This might have contributed to his deliberately opaque and misleading language. He also appropriated the concepts, traditions and names of ideological opponents. For example he seeks to transform the meaning of The Enlightenment: in its old form it represented “the spirit of the democratic herd: a universal levelling. The new Enlightenment aims at showing dominant natures the way; inasmuch as to these (as to the State), everything is permitted that is barred to the herd mentality.” (quoted in Lukács)
For a few years, when Germany’s rulers began experimenting with limited parliamentary democracy in the hope of containing worker unrest in the English fashion, Nietzsche steered toward more moderate formulations, without ever losing his underlying commitment to the master/slave dichotomy. As working class struggle intensified in the second half of the 1870s he returned to more openly brutal formulations.
Nietzsche became an inspiration to the Nazis. But he himself was not particularly interested in ethnicity or Aryanism; in this sense he may have been no more racist than the average bourgeois of his day. What singles him out, and provided grounds for fascists to build on, is the vicious notion, emphasised again and again, that humanity is naturally and permanently divided into masters, to whom all is permitted, and a subhuman caste, to whom anything might legitimately be done.
Nietzsche on women
Given all this, it is no surprise to read that
One-half of mankind is weak, typically sick, changeable, inconstant – woman needs strength in order to cleave to it… she makes the strong weak – she rules when she succeeds in overcoming the strong… (The Will to Power 864)
We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to encounter creatures who have only dancing, nonsense and finery in their minds! They have always been the delight of every tense and profound male soul… (The Will to Power 943)
For more of the same see the relevant Wikipedia entry.
Jacques Derrida defends Nietzsche’s position on this score. Derrida’s case is summed up by his admirer Christopher Norris:
If woman is indeed the antithesis of truth, the very principle of unreason, then she can only be counted as an ally in Nietzsche’s crusade against the great system-building male philosophers, from Plato to Kant to Hegel… Thus Derrida can claim – “perversely” one might think, but as the upshot of a close exegesis – that Nietzsche is not only ambivalent in his attitude to woman but can even be read as a crypto-feminist resisting all attempts to bypass or sublimate the question of sexual difference. (Christopher Norris, Derrida, Fontana London 1987, p202, 203)
Nietzsche and postmodernism
Nietzsche’s politics are not, of course, shared by the postmodernists, who have tended toward liberal stances when dabbling in concrete issues. Foucault, for example, supported prison reform, while Derrida opposed apartheid in South Africa. They seek to explain away Nietzsche’s bestial political agenda, using pitiful rationales of the kind supplied by Norris. In doing so they are helped by the fact, already mentioned, that Nietzsche’s political program comes down to us softened and partially disguised by word-play, paradox and ambiguity, like a fist seen through mottled glass.
What the postmodernists really take from Nietzsche is not his political program but his philosophy, which offers a point-by-point attack on the underpinning ideas of Marxism. This is why they are willing to draw so heavily on someone who was also a forerunner of the Nazis. Nietzsche’s philosophy will be the topic of the next post in this series.
*Lukács published The Destruction of Reason in 1952. The book traces the history of the major irrationalist currents of thought over the preceding two centuries,up to the rise of Nazism. In the early 1920s Lukacs made important contributions to Marxist theory through books such as History and Class Consciousness. Afterwards he bent the knee to Stalin. The Destruction of Reason is nonetheless one of the most useful I have come across for understanding the background to postmodernism. Fortunately the chapter on Nietzsche is available free online.
**The Will to Power is a long list of numbered epigrams. Since these stay the same between different editions of the book, they are handier to use than page numbers. The exact wording changes, of course, between different translations. The epigrams quoted above were taken from an old edition, TN Foulis London 1910. The Will to Power was published posthumously by Nietzsche’s sister, leading to allegations that she meddled with the text to advance her more explicit racism and more focused commitment to German imperialism. The text of The Will to Power is however completely consistent with the rest of Nietzsche’s works on the issues of class and the nature of women.
This is the second in a series of posts on postmodernism.
Postmodernism arose from the intersection of two trends. One was the onset of hard times economically as the long post-world war 2 boom finally came to an end. Profits were increasingly being made not by expanding production but by sackings, by welfare cuts, by intensifying the work process, and by cannibalising the system itself, running down and/or selling off public infrastructure. In this climate personal life and relationships became harsher.
It came at the end of the social protest era of the late 1960s and early 70s. Rather than boosting those protests, it played a key role in snuffing them out. Unemployment lowered workers’ bargaining power and confidence to act; the union officials were won to the need to defend the “national interest” instead of their members’ living standards. So just as things were getting worse, the vision of something qualitatively better, of revolution or liberation, faded. Horizons narrowed. The new neoliberal world of austerity might be rotten, it might be going nowhere, but it was the world, nothing could exist beyond it.
It was not so rotten for everyone. A new middle class did rather well out of it, including former student activists who moved into well paid jobs. Neoliberalism was empty, visionless; we were plainly steering toward ecological disaster, with no-one at the wheel; “reform” was now double-speak for regression; but for some, the money rolled in. The cynicism of former activists resonated with much wider sections of the new middle class, particularly in the public sector most exposed to cost-cutting and privatisation .
Success in the new middle class, the middle layers within public and corporate bureaucracies meant cultivating and maintaining connections within professional networks and negotiating more complex corporate hierarchies. In this world, personal appeal was increasingly useful as a tool of trade; it had a growing cash value. One of the effects of this was to produce a “narcissistic obsession with the body, both male and female”. Self-cultivation, “forming oneself into a particular kind of person”, became an art form. (Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, pages 162-172; the quotes are from page 169).
Postmodernism was the worldview that emerged from this social layer. The core ideas of this worldview are a point-by-point challenge to the central ideas of Marxism, the great enemy that must be brought down. But in the process it also cut across core elements of any theory of liberation, including that of radical feminism.
Antihumanism and the “death of the subject”
Marxism shares with liberalism a belief in the dignity of the human personality, the sense that there is a universe within every mind, which deserves freedom to flourish. For Marxism, this humanist vision can only be achieved by the collective class struggle and workers’ revolution, but once real communism is attained each personality will have vast potential for further development. Postmodernism denies this.
Like Marxism, it emphasises the role of external social forces in shaping people’s interior lives, but in the case of postmodernism this takes the extreme form of removing the human personality entirely as a point of focus. People are not twisted by an alienated society. There is nothing to be twisted. Working people’s inner lives are not cramped and contorted by class oppression, nor are women’s inner lives cramped by sexual oppression. There is nothing there to be cramped, stunted or distorted.
This denial of personal depth is concurrent with the seemingly contradictory theme of self-cultivation. In reality, self-cultivation is a for the new middle class, depersonalisation is for the swinish multitude.
Humans have no agency
Closely related to this “death of the subject” is people’s lack of agency, lack of capacity to change the world. Liberalism says individuals are active agents who can change their personal situation and sometimes society as a whole. Marxism says working people can change the world when they act together as a class. Postmodernism says people are inert chess pieces moved about by objective forces (language in the case of Derrida, power-knowledge for Foucault) which they can never bring under collective human control.
Surface not depth
The superficiality of people is mirrored in society. While Marxism says the appearance of society conceals the fundamental struggle of workers and capitalists, postmodernism says that society has no hidden depths. Everything exists on the surface.
Postmodernism is idealist in the philosophical sense of asserting the primacy of ideas over the material world. The factory, stock exchange and police truncheon fade from view: power is only about language – “discourse”. Within discourse lurks something that plays the role of God: it shapes what people think and do, but is not, in turn, shaped in any decisive way by human action. Discourse shapes us but we don’t shape it: we are forever imprisoned within it.
Postmodernism says that the world cannot be understood via reason. In fact it can’t really be understood at all, so we can’t change it in any significant way. Ideas are playthings for academic presentations, popular books and dinner party chat. The deliberately confusing language common in academia, that pretends to profound wisdom you are just too stupid to grasp, is celebrated and taken further here.
The old slogan one struggle, one fight – the notion that only in unity do we have the power to overthrow capitalism, is seen by postmodernists like Foucault as a sinister move to “theorise the totality” – to capture and control people’s entire way of thinking for your own gain. By proposing a comprehensive worldview, the postmodernists say, Marxists only reveal their lust for total domination, as evidenced in Stalinist Russia.
The groundwork for transgender ideology
Postmodernism feeds into the most conservative aspects of trans ideology. Women’s cumulative personal experience, that constitutes such an important aspect of their oppression under current society, is dispensed with. The body matters, not the personality. Sexuality is simply about bodies and pleasures. And the body, like the rest of the material world, is what we choose to make it.
The next posts will look at two ideological currents that the postmodernists draw on – the ideas of Nietzsche and the structuralism of the 1960s.
If you identify as a girl, assigned female at birth, and you like the colour pink, you like wearing dresses and sparkly things, that’s awesome. But if you are a boy who likes pink sparkly things that’s also awesome.
It’s not a case of saying, let’s break everything down so that there’s nothing, so there’s no meaning in anything. It’s a case of opening it up so everybody can have access to everything.
These are comments from CJ Atkinson, author of the new book Can I Tell You About Gender Diversity? They are quoted in a promotional article in the The Guardian , which explains that the book is “being introduced into some [British] primary schools as a resource for children, parents and teachers, and claims to be the first book to explain ‘medical transitioning’ to children as young as seven.” The article comfortably notes criticisms of the book from right wing sources. It adds:
The 60-page booklet is the latest in the Can I Tell You About …? series of books published by Jessica Kingsley Publishers which are designed to offer a simple introduction to sometimes complex and challenging issues, including adoption, autism, depression, eating disorders and ME/chronic fatigue syndrome.
The book is therefore part of a continuing push to normalise transgender identity and conceal its elite-driven origins and its ideological underpinnings.
Like many if not most people viewing this article, I do not expect to read the book. The article itself is of interest, though, as a stand-alone item, particularly the comments quoted above from Atkinson. They could be read as progressive in intent: the first sentence designed just to soothe traditional-minded parents, and the rest a call to free both girls and boys from any kind of sex-stereotypic pressures. Or they could be read as articulating the conservatism of trans ideology: pinkification is a free choice females make, and something to celebrate; “access to everything” only means access to the alternative stereotype; females remain forever handcuffed to femininity, and males to masculinity.
So, is the message in these quoted comments progressive or conservative? How about “progressive” and conservative. Rather than wonder what exactly Atkinson had in mind, it is more useful to see the article as continuing the mass media tradition of appealing simultaneously to multiple audiences around the issue of transgender, to offer something for everyone. Left-liberals who still feel some uneasiness about the stereotyping inherent in trans ideology are soothed with vague suggestions that all is well. More traditionalist readers are assured that this strange new trend does not really threaten their core values.